Agricultural and energy commodity prices have traditionally exhibited relatively loweven negative correlation. However, the recent increases in biofuel production have altered the agriculture-energy relationship in a fundamental way. The amount of corn utilized for ethanol production in the US has increased from 5% in 2001 to over one-third by the end of the decade. This increase has drawn corn previously sold to other uses (exports, food, feed), as well as acreage devoted to other crops (e.g., oilseeds and other grains). In addition, there has been an increase in the demand for production inputs, especially fertilizers, which are heavily energy-intensive. In short, the previous "biofuel decade" has led to significant changes in the US, and indeed the global economy.
Introduction
U.S. policy-makers have responded to increased public interest in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and lessening dependence on foreign supplies of energy with Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) that impose aggressive mandates on biofuel use in domestic refining. These mandates are in addition to the longstanding price policies (blending subsidies and import tariffs) used to promote the domestic ethanol industry's growth. Recently, a number of authors have begun to explore the linkages between energy and agricultural markets in light of these new policies (McPhail and Babock; Hochman, Sexton, and Zilberman; Chantret and Gohin; Tyner) . It is clear from this work that we are entering a new era in which energy prices will play a more important role in driving agricultural commodity prices. However, based on experience during the past year, it is also clear that the coordination between energy and agriculture is fundamentally different at high oil prices vs. at low oil prices, as well as in the presence of binding policy regimes. While the RFS became temporarily non-binding with the onset of a new year in 2009, a new phenomenon began to emerge, namely the presence of a blend wall (Tyner, 2009b) . With refineries unable to blend more than 10% ethanol into gasoline for normal consumption, an excess supply of ethanol began to emerge in many regional markets (due to infrastructure limitations there is not a single national market for ethanol). This has led to a separation of the ethanol and oil prices, with the oil price continuing to fall, while corn prices, and hence ethanol prices, remained at levels that no longer permit ethanol to compete with petroleum on an energy basis; therefore, the monthly corn-petroleum price correlation in the final period of Figure 1 is much weaker (.56).
In this paper, we develop a framework specifically designed for analyzing the linkages between energy and agricultural markets under different policy regimes. We employ a combination of theoretical analysis, econometrics and stochastic simulation.
Specifically, we are interested in examining how energy price volatility has been transmitted to commodity prices, and how changes in energy policy regimes affect the inherent volatility of commodity prices in response to traditional supply-side shocks. We find that biofuels have played an important role in facilitating increased integration between energy and agricultural markets. In the absence of a binding RFS, and assuming that the blend wall is relaxed by expanding the maximum permissible ethanol content in petroleum, we find that, by 2015, the contribution of energy price volatility to year-onyear corn price variation will be much greater -nearly two-thirds of the crop supplyinduced volatility. However, if the RFS is binding in 2015, then the role of energy price volatility in crop price volatility is diminished. Meanwhile, the sensitivity of crop prices to traditional supply-side shocks is exacerbated due to the price inelastic nature of RFS demands. Indeed, the presence of a totally inelastic demand for corn in ethanol would boost the sensitivity of corn prices to supply side shocks by nearly 50%. Similar results ensue in the presence of a binding blend wall.
Literature Review
Energy, and energy intensive inputs play a large role in the production of agricultural products. Gellins and Parmenter (2004) estimate that energy accounts for around 70-80% of the total costs used to manufacture fertilizers. Additional linkages come in the form of transportation of inputs, as well as the use of diesel or gasoline onfarm or in the transportation of commodities. Overall, USDA/ERS Cost of Production estimates indicate that energy inputs accounted for almost 30% of the total cost of corn production for the US in 2008 1 .
Another important linkage to energy markets is on the output side, as agricultural commodities are increasingly being used as feedstocks for biofuels used in liquid fuels. Hertel, Tyner and Birur (2010) price and use. They note that the RFS provides a discontinuity between crude oil and ethanol prices. As a consequence, they find that the implied elasticity of a change in oil price on corn price is .31 (i.e., a 1% increase in the price of oil leads to a .31% increase in the corn price) with no RFS, and .17 with the RFS.
This brief literature review suggests the potential for some interesting hypotheses about potential linkages between agricultural and energy markets. The purpose of the next section of the paper is to develop an analytical framework within which these can be clearly stated as a set of formal propositions.
Analytical Framework
Consider an ethanol industry producing total output ( E Q ) and selling it into two domestic market segments: in the first market, ethanol is used as a gasoline additive ( E QA ), in strict proportion to total gasoline production. As previously discussed, legal developments in the additive market (the banning of more economical MTBE as an oxygenator/octane enhancer) were an important component of the US ethanol boom between 2001 and 2006. The second market segment is the market for ethanol as a pricesensitive energy substitute ( E QP ). In contrast to the additive market, the demand in this market depends importantly on the relative prices of ethanol and petroleum. For ease of exposition, and to be consistent with the general equilibrium specification introduced later on, we will think of the additive demand as a derived demand by the petroleum refinery sector, and the energy substitution as being undertaken by consumers of liquid fuel. By assigning two different agents to these two functions, we can clearly specify the market shares governed by the two different types of behavior.
Market clearing for ethanol, in the absence of exports, may then be written as:
or, in percentage change form, where lower case denotes the percentage change in the upper case variable:
(1 
where F q is the percentage change in the total production of liquid fuel, for which the additive/oxygenator is demanded in fixed proportions. The price sensitive portion of ethanol demand can be parsimoniously parameterized as follows: (4) into (2), we obtain a revised expression for ethanol market clearing:
On the supply side, we assume constant returns to scale in ethanol production, which, along with entry/exit (a very common phenomenon in the ethanol industry since late 2007 -indeed today plants shut down one month and start up the next), gives zero pure profits:
Where E p is the percentage change in the producer price for ethanol, jE p is the percentage change in price of input j , used in ethanol production, and jE θ is the share of that input in total ethanol costs (see Figure 2 for evidence of the validity of (6) since 2007). Assuming non-corn inputs supplied to the ethanol sector (e.g., labor and capital) are in perfectly elastic supply, and abstracting from direct energy use in ethanol production (both assumptions will be relaxed in the empirical model) we have jE p = 0, j C ∀ ≠ , and we can solve (6) for the corn price in terms of ethanol price changes:
Assuming that corn is used in fixed proportion to ethanol output (i.e. / CE E Q Q is fixed), we can complete the supply-side specification for the ethanol market with the following equations governing the derived demand for, and supply of, corn in ethanol:
where EC ν is the net supply elasticity of corn to the ethanol sector, i.e. it is equal to the supply elasticity of corn, net of the price responsiveness in other demands for corn (outside of ethanol). This will be developed in more detail momentarily when we turn to equilibrium in the corn market. Substituting (9) into (8) and then using (7) to eliminate the corn price, we obtain an equation for the market supply of ethanol:
Now turn to the corn market, where there are two sources of demand for corn output ( C Q ): the ethanol industry, which buys CE Q , and all other uses of corn, CO Q .
Letting β denote the share of total corn sales to ethanol, market clearing in the corn market may thus be written as:
We characterize non-ethanol corn demands as consisting of two parts: a price sensitive portion governed by a simple, constant elasticity of corn demand, CD η , as well as a random demand shock (e.g., stemming from a shock to GDP in the home or foreign markets), CD ∆ . Ethanol demand for corn has already been specified in (8). We will shortly solve for CE q , so we leave that in the equation, giving us the following market clearing condition for corn:
As with demand, corn supply is specified via a price responsive portion, governed by the constant elasticity of supply, CS η , and a random supply shock (e.g., driven by weather volatility), CS ∆ , yielding:
At this point, we can derive an expression for the net corn supply to ethanol production by solving (12) for CE q and using (13) to eliminate corn supply ( C q ). This yields the following expression for net corn supply to the ethanol industry:
The term in brackets {.} is CE ν , the net supply elasticity of corn to the ethanol sector. The second term in (14) translates random shocks to corn supply and other corn demands into random shocks to net corn supply to ethanol. These shocks are larger, the more volatile are the shocks to corn supply and demand (which we will assume to be independently distributed in the empirical section below) and the smaller the share of ethanol demand in total corn use. We denote the total effect of this random component (the second term in (14)) by the term CE ∆ which we term the random shock to the net supply of corn to the ethanol industry.
We can now solve this partial equilibrium model for equilibrium in the corn ethanol market. To do so, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. Firstly, we assume that growth in the household portion of the liquid fuel market ( F qp ) is equal to growth in total liquid fuel use ( F q ), and that this aggregate liquid fuel demand may be characterized via a constant elasticity of demand for liquid fuels, FD η . This permits us to write the aggregate demand for ethanol as follows:
For purposes of this simple, partial equilibrium, analytical exercise, we will assume that the share of ethanol in aggregate liquid fuel use is small, so that we may ignore the impact of E p on F p . In so doing, we will consider the liquid fuels price to be synonymous with the price of petroleum. Thus a one percent shock to the price of ethanol will reduce total ethanol demand byασ . Conversely, a one percent exogenous shock to the price of petroleum, has two separate effects, one negative (the expansion effect) and one positive (the substitution effect): FD η α + σ . Provided the share of total sales to the price-responsive portion of the market (α ) is large enough, and assuming ethanol is a reasonably good substitute for petroleum, then the second (positive) term dominates and we expect the rise in petroleum prices to lead to a rise in the demand for ethanol.
However, if for some reason the second term is eliminated -for example due to ethanol demand encountering a blend wall, as described by Tyner (2010) -then this relationship may be reversed, i.e. a rise in petroleum prices will reduce the aggregate demand for liquid fuels, and, in so doing, it will reduce the demand for ethanol.
We solve the model by equating ethanol supply (14) to ethanol demand (15), noting that corn demand in ethanol changes proportionately with ethanol production (8) and using (7) to translate the change in corn price into a change in ethanol price.
Equation (16) may be solved for the price of ethanol as a function of exogenous shocks to the corn market and to the liquid fuels market:
Giving rise to:
This equilibrium outcome may be translated back into a change in corn prices, via (7):
Recalling the following:
it is clear that a random shock to the non-ethanol, corn market ( CE ∆ ) will result in a larger change in corn price, the more inelastic are corn supply and demand (as reflected by the CE ν term in the denominator of (19)) and the smaller the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum ( σ ), the smaller the share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the fuel market (α ), and the smaller the cost share of corn in ethanol production ( CE θ ). However, the role of the sales share of corn going to ethanol ( β ), is ambiguous and requires further analysis. Consider first, the impact only of a random shock to corn supply. In this case the expression for the corn price as a function of CS ∆ (substituting (20) into the denominator and numerator) becomes:
Multiplying top and bottom by β and rearranging the denominator, we get:
Now, it is clear that, provided the derived demand elasticity for corn in ethanol use exceeds that in other uses, i.e., EC CD θ α η σ > − , a rise in the share of corn sales to ethanol will dampen the volatility of corn prices in response to a corn supply shock. Of course, if something were to happen in the fuel market, for example, ethanol use hits the blend wall, then the potential for substituting ethanol for petroleum would be eliminated and the opposite result will apply, namely, an increased reliance of corn producers on ethanol markets will actually destabilize corn market responses to corn supply shocks. As we will see below, this is a very important result.
Now consider the impact of increasing β on the volatility of corn price in response to a (non-ethanol) corn demand shock. Substitution and reorganization yields the following expression:
The presence of (1-) β in the numerator means that higher values of β reduce the numerator. Provided the derived demand for corn by ethanol is more price responsive than non-ethanol demand, such that higher values of β increase the denominator in (23),
we can say unambiguously that increased ethanol sales to corn result in more corn price stability in response to a given non-ethanol demand shock. However, when the derived demand for corn by ethanol is less price responsive than non-ethanol demand, the outcome is ambiguous.
Finally, consider the impact only of a random shock to fuel prices. Proceeding as above we obtain the following expression: We are now able to state several important propositions which form the basis for our empirical analysis below:
Proposition 1: A random shock to the corn supply ( CS ∆ ) will result in a larger change in corn price, the more inelastic are corn supply and demand (as reflected in the numerator of CE ν ), the smaller the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum ethanol ( σ ), the smaller the share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the fuel market (α ), and the smaller the cost share of corn in ethanol production ( CE θ ). The impact of a larger the share of corn going to ethanol ( β ) depends on the relative responsiveness of corn demand in ethanol and non-ethanol markets. If the ethanol market is more price responsive, then an increase in β dampens the price volatility in response to a supply shock. However, if the ethanol market is less price responsive (e.g. due to the blend wall) then higher sales to ethanol serve to destabilize the corn market's response to a supply side shock.
Proposition 2: A random shock to the non-ethanol corn demand ( CD ∆ ) will result in a larger change in corn price, the more inelastic are corn supply and demand (as reflected in the numerator of CE ν ), the smaller the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum ethanol ( σ ), the smaller the share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the fuel market (α ), and the smaller the cost share of corn in ethanol production ( CE θ ). The impact of a larger share of corn going to ethanol ( β ) is unambiguous when ethanol demand is more price responsive than other demand -it serves to lessen the volatility in corn prices with respect to a shock in non-ethanol demand. When ethanol demand is not price responsive (e.g., due to a blend wall), then an increase in sales to ethanol may destabilize the corn market's response to a shock to nonethanol demand.
Proposition 3: An increase in global fuel prices ( F p ) will boost corn prices, provided the sales share-weighted elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum in price sensitive uses (ασ > 0 ) is not dominated by the price elasticity of aggregate demand for liquid fuels ( 0 FD η < ). The magnitude of this corn price change will be larger the more inelastic are corn supply and demand (as reflected in the denominator term EC ν ), the larger the share of corn going to ethanol ( β ), and the smaller the cost share of corn in ethanol production ( CE θ ).
With a bit more information, we can also shed light on two important special cases in which policy regimes are binding. When oil prices are low, such that the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) is binding, then the total sales of corn to the ethanol market are pre-determined ( 0 CE q = ) so that the only price responsive portion of corn demand is the non-ethanol component. In this case, the equilibrium change in corn price simplifies to the following:
Note that the price of liquid fuel does not appear in this expression at all. Since our PE model abstracts from the impact of fuel prices on production costs of corn and ethanol, the RFS wholly eliminates the transmission of fuel prices through to the corn market by fixing the demand for ethanol in liquid fuels. The second point to note is that the responsiveness corn prices to random shocks in the corn market is now magnified by the absence of the substitution-related term, CE θ ασ , in the denominator. This leads to the third proposition.
Proposition 4:
The binding RFS eliminates the output demand-driven link between liquid fuel prices and corn prices. Furthermore, with a binding RFS, the responsiveness of corn prices to a random shock in corn supply or demand is magnified. The extent of this magnification (relative to the non-binding case) is larger, the larger is the share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the market, the larger the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum, and the larger the cost share of corn in ethanol production.
The other important special case considered below is that of a binding Blend Wall (BW). In this case, there is no scope for altering the mix of ethanol in liquid fuels.
Therefore the substitution effect in (15) drops out and the demand for ethanol simplifies to:
In this case, the equilibrium corn price expression simplifies to the following:
Note that the price of liquid fuel has re-appeared in the numerator, but the coefficient premultiplying this price is now negative. This gives rise to the fifth, and final, proposition.
Proposition 5: The binding Blend Wall changes the qualitative relationship between liquid fuel prices and corn prices. Now, a fall in liquid fuel prices, which induces additional fuel consumption, will stimulate the demand for corn and hence boost corn prices. As with the binding RFS, the responsiveness of corn prices to a random shock in corn supply or demand is again magnified. The extent of this magnification (relative to the non-binding case) is larger, the larger is the share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the market, the larger the elasticity of substitution between ethanol and petroleum, and the larger the cost share of corn in ethanol production.
This simple, partial equilibrium analysis of the linkages between liquid fuel and corn markets has been useful in sharpening our thinking about key underlying relationships. However, it is necessarily rather simplified. As noted above, we have ignored the role of energy input costs in corn and ethanol production -even though these are rather energy intensive sectors. We have also ignored the important role of biofuel by-products. Yet, sales of Dried Distillers Grains with Solubles (DDGS) account for about 16% of the industry's revenues and their sale competes directly with corn and other feedstuffs in the livestock industry (Taheripour et al., 2010) . And we have failed to distinguish feed demands for corn from processed food demands. Finally, we have abstracted from international trade, which has become an increasingly important dimension of the corn, ethanol, DDGS and liquid fuel markets. For all these reasons, the empirical model introduced in the next section is more complex than that laid out above.
Nonetheless, we will see that propositions 1 -5 continue to offer useful insights into the results.
Empirical Framework
Overview of the Approach: Given the characteristic high price volatility in energy and agricultural markets, the complex interrelationships between petroleum, ethanol, and, by explicitly disaggregating the major producing and consuming regions of the world we are better able to characterize the fundamental sources of volatility in these markets.
From Jorgenson's (1984) insight into the importance of utilizing econometric work in parameter estimation, to more recent calls for rigorous historical model testing (Hertel, 1999; Kehoe, 2003; Grassini, 2004) , it is clear that CGE models must be adequately tested against historical data to improve their performance and reliability. The Table 2 ), along with the relevant energy price shocks, the result is a reasonable approximation to key features of the more recent economy.
The updating of the model allows us the opportunity to test the model's ability to replicate the strengthened relationship between energy and agricultural prices. We do so by implementing the very same stochastic shocks used for the validation experiment in 2001, only now on our updated economy, and observe the estimated corn price variation.
As Figure 1 illustrated, the correlation between oil and corn prices strengthened considerably over the 2001-2008 time period (note that before 2001, the correlation between the two was negative); therefore, our hypothesis (and indeed our model performance check) is that the transmission of energy price volatility will be higher than the pre-2001 period. Updating the model also allows us the chance to explore the empirical dimensions of propositions 1-3 which emerged from the theoretical model.
All of this work sets the stage for an in-depth exploration of the role of biofuel policy regimes in governing the extent to which volatility in energy markets is transmitted to agricultural commodity markets and the extent to which increased sales of agricultural commodities to biofuels alters the sensitivity of these markets to agricultural supply-side shocks. For this part of the analysis, we focus on the year 2015, in which the RFS for US corn ethanol reaches its target of 15 billion gallons/year, and a blend wall could potentially be binding. In order to reach the target amount, we implement a quantity shock to the model which will increase U.S. ethanol production to 15 billion gallons/year. We do not run a full update experiment (as we did for the 2001-2008 time period) as we do not know exactly how the key exogenous variables will evolve over this future period. 2 We assume that the distributions of supply side shocks in agriculture and energy markets, as well as the inter-annual volatility in regional GDPs remain unchanged from their historical values; this has the virtue of allowing us to focus on the impact of the changing structure of the economy on corn price volatility.
Based on Proposition 4, we hypothesize that, at low oil prices, stochastic draws in the presence of a binding RFS will render corn markets more sensitive to agricultural supply-side shocks, since a substantial portion of the corn market (the mandated ethanol use) will be insensitive to price, while at high corn prices, the opposite will be true, due to the highly elastic demand for ethanol as a substitute for corn. On the other hand, again, based on Proposition 4, we expect energy market volatility to have relatively little impact on corn markets at low oil prices.
At high oil prices there are two possibilities -in the first case, the RFS is nonbinding and the blend wall is not a factor (i.e., it has been increased from 10% to 12 or 15%). In this case, we expect to see the influence of a larger share of corn going to ethanol ( β ), and also a larger share of ethanol going to the price responsive portion of the fuel market (α ), translated into lesser sensitivity to random supply shocks emanating from the corn market (Proposition 1).
In the second case, high oil prices induce expansion of the ethanol industry to the point where the blend wall is binding so that Proposition 5 becomes relevant. In this case, the qualitative relationship between oil prices and corn prices is reversed; as with the binding RFS, the impact of random shocks to corn supply or demand will be magnified with a binding blend wall.
Before investigating these hypotheses empirically, we must first characterize the extent of volatility in agricultural and energy markets. In terms of the PE model developed above, we must estimate the parameters underlying the distributions of CS ∆ , CD ∆ , and F p .
Characterizing Sources of Volatility in Energy and Agricultural Markets
The distributions of the stochastic shocks to corn production, corn demand and oil prices are assumed to be normally and independently distributed. Given the great many uses of corn in the global economy, we prefer to shock the underlying determinant of demand, namely GDP, allowing the GDP shocks to vary by model region. Of course GDP shocks also result in oil price changes, and, in a separate line of work, we have focused on the ability of this model to reproduce observed oil price volatility based on GDP shocks and oil supply shocks. However, in this paper, we prefer to perturb oil prices directly so that we may separately identify energy price shocks and more general shocks to the economy.
To characterize the systematic component in corn production, times-series models are fitted to National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) data on annual corn production (corn easily commands the largest share of coarse grains, the corresponding GTAP sector; hence the focus on corn) over the time period of 1981-2008 3 . For crude oil prices, we use Energy Information Administration (EIA) data on US average price and average import price (we take a simple average of the two series) over the same time periods. Demand-side shocks also play a role in determining commodity price volatility.
Here, we use the variation in regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to capture changes in aggregate demand in each of the markets.
The key result of interest from the time-series regressions on both the supply and demand sides is the normalized standard deviation of the estimated residuals, reported in Table 3 4 . This result summarizes variability of the non-systematic aspect of annual production, prices and GDP in each region for the 1981-2008 time period (sectors and regions are defined in Appendices A1 and A2). This is calculated as variance (of estimated residuals) divided by the mean value of production (or prices, or GDP), and multiplied by 100%. Not surprisingly, from table 3, we see that corn production and oil prices were much more volatile than GDP over the time period, with oil prices being somewhat more volatile than corn production. Note that we do not attempt to estimate region-specific variances for oil prices as we assume this to be a well-integrated market.
Results for 2001 and 2008
Pre-Biofuel Era: Our first task is to examine the performance of the model with respect to the 2001 base period. The first pair of columns in Table 4 reports the modelgenerated standard deviations in annual percentage change in US coarse grains prices based on several alternative stochastic simulations. In the first column, we report the standard deviations in coarse grains prices when all three stochastic shocks from Table 3 are simultaneously implemented. Focusing on the US, the model with all three shocks estimates the standard deviation of annual percentage changes in corn prices to be 28.5, while the historical outcome (over the entire 1982-2008 period) revealed a standard deviation of just 20. So the model over-predicts volatility in corn markets. This is likely due to the fact that it treats producers and consumers as myopic agents who use only current information on planting and pricing to inform their production decisions. By incorporating forward looking behavior as well as stockholding, we would expect the model to produce less price variation. Introducing more elastic consumer demand would be one way of mimicking such effects and inducing the model to more closely follow historical price volatility.
The second column under the 2001 heading reports the impact on coarse grains price volatility of oil price shocks only. From these results, it is clear that the energy price shocks have little impact on corn markets in the pre-biofuel era. In the US, the amount of coarse grains price variation generated by oil price-only shocks is just a s.d. of 1.1%, whereas the variation from the three sources is 28.5% (resulting in oil's share of the total equaling 0.04, as reported in parentheses in Table 3 ). This confirms the findings of Tyner (2009) who reports almost no integration of crude oil and corn prices over the [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] period.
The third column in Table 4 reports the observed variation in coarse grains prices from volatility in corn production. This indicates that the majority of corn price variation in this historical period (0.96 of the total) was due to volatility in corn production.
Biofuel Era:
As discussed above, we update the data base to 2008 in order to provide a reasonably current representation of the global economy in the context of the biofuel era.
We then redo the same stochastic simulation experiments as 2001 to explore the energy/agricultural commodity price transmission in the biofuel era. The middle set of columns in Table 4 present the results from this experiment.
The model estimates somewhat higher overall coarse grain price variation (s.d. of 30.7%) in this case. Now, the ratio of the variation from energy price shocks to the total shocks is 0.32, versus the 0.04 for the 2001 data base. This is hardly surprising in light of expression (19) and Proposition 3. Referring to Table 1 , which summarizes some of the key parameters/pieces of data from the AGE models for the three base years, we see that the shares of coarse grains going to ethanol production ( β ) rises, four-fold over this period. In addition, the share of ethanol going to the price sensitive side of the market (α ) nearly doubles, and the net supply elasticity of corn to ethanol falls. Based on Proposition 3, all of these changes serve to boost the responsiveness of corn pries to liquid fuel prices. Meanwhile, the contribution of corn supply shocks to total volatility is somewhat reduces, as we would expect from the larger values for α , β and CE θ , although the smaller net supply elasticity of corn to ethanol works in the opposite direction.
(
The Future of Energy-Agriculture Interactions in the Presence of Alternative Policies
Having completed our analysis of energy and agricultural commodity interactions in the current environment, we now turn to our analysis of US biofuel policies. US policy mandates that 15 billion gallons of corn ethanol be produced by 2015, up from the little more than 7 billion gallons produced in 2008 (this is known as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)). We implement this mandate by increasing US ethanol production through a quantity increase, following Hertel, Tyner, and Birur (2010) . Since producers don't actually receive a subsidy for meeting the RFS, the additional cost of producing liquid fuels must be passed forward to consumers. We accomplish this by taxing the combined liquid fuel product by the amount of the subsidy.
The key point about the RFS is that it is asymmetric. Thus, when the RFS is just binding ( 0, ( 1) 0 RFS S QR > − = , a further rise in the price of gasoline will increase ethanol production past the mandated amount, as ethanol is better able to compete with gasoline on an energy basis. In contrast, a decrease in the price of gasoline does nothing to ethanol production (i.e., it stays at the 15 billion gallon mark) as this is the mandated amount and so 0 S > ensures that the ethanol continues to be used at current levels.
A blend wall works differently from the RFS; as pointed out by Tyner (2009) Table 4 .
2) RFS is binding, i.e., ethanol production can not fall below 15 billion gallons, but if oil prices are large enough, ethanol demand can be utilized past the 15 billion gallon mark. Here coarse grains demand is more inelastic; commodity price volatility is greater in the wake of the supply-side shocks, but not as responsive to energy price shocks as it was in the base case. Results from this and the subsequent experiments are reported in Table 5. 3) RFS is not binding; however, the blend wall is binding. We expect the impact of energy price shocks on commodity price volatility to be lowest in this case, as ethanol production will not be able to expand as readily to high oil prices because of the blend wall.
4) Both RFS and blend wall are binding. This could happen if the blend wall were adjusted just enough to permit the RFS to be met.
Results for the 2015 base case (Table 4) indicate that, relative to the 2008 data base, energy price shocks contribute more to coarse grain price variation. Indeed, energy price volatility now contributes to a s.d. of 15.6, or 0.53 of the total variation in corn prices (but still less than the independent variation induced by corn supply side shocks).
This result is expected, as even more corn is going to ethanol production (Table 1) , and there is double the amount of ethanol produced as compared to the 2008 data base. In addition, ethanol production is free to respond to low and high oil price draws from the stochastic simulations, since there is not an RFS or blend wall in place. The contribution of corn production volatility shocks to corn price variation is also lowest for this case.
For the second scenario we follow the same process as before to stimulate ethanol production to the RFS amount and we run the same stochastic sims; however, we assume that the RFS is just binding and we implement the requirement that US ethanol production can not fall below 15 billion gallons. Results for this scenario indicate (refer to Table 5 ) that the share of energy price volatility to total corn price variation is cut in half from the base case (from 0.53 to 0.26); due to the fact that we truncate the ability of the model to respond to low energy price draws by using less ethanol. The implementation of the RFS also leads to highest much higher variation in corn prices. In proposition 4, we demonstrated the cause of this, i.e., the RFS severs the consumer demand driven link between liquid fuels price and corn prices in the presence of low oil prices. The absence of price responsiveness in this important sector translates into a magnification of the responsiveness of corn prices to random shocks to corn production and non-ethanol demand.
For the third scenario, we allow the RFS to be non-binding, but we implement a blend wall, which is assumed to be just binding. The results from this case indicate that the share of energy price volatility to total corn price variation is at an even lower level. This is substantiated by Tyner (2009) who notes that the blend wall effectively breaks the link between crude oil and corn prices, as ethanol cannot react to high oil prices; but at low oil prices the blend wall does little to reduce demand for ethanol.
The final scenario in Table 5 is the case wherein both the RFS and the BW are binding. This largely eliminates the demand-side feedback from energy prices to the corn market, which is what we see in the results, with oil price volatility accounting for just 0.03 of the total variation in corn prices. In contrast, the price responsiveness of corn to supply side shocks is greatly increased. Indeed, when compared to the 2015 base case, corn price volatility in the face of the very same supply side shocks is 57% greater. If we look at the final row of Table 5 , we see that global price volatility is much increased under this scenario, rising by about one-quarter. Clearly binding energy policies have the potential to greatly destabilize agricultural commodity markets in the future.
Discussion
The relationship between agricultural and energy commodity markets has strengthened significantly with the recent increase in biofuel production. Energy has always played an important role in agricultural production inputs; however, the combination of recent high energy prices with policies aimed at promoting energy security and renewable fuel use have stimulated the use of crop feedstocks in biofuel production. With a mandate to further increase biofuel production in the US, it is clear that the relationship amongst agricultural and energy commodities may grow even stronger.
Results from this work indicate that the era of rapid biofuel production did strengthen the transmission of energy price volatility on agricultural commodity price variation. Furthermore, the additional mandated production will go further in strengthening this transmission. However, policy regimes are going to play a critical role in determining the nature of this linkage. The presence of a Renewable Fuels Standard can hinder the ethanol's sectors ability to react to low oil prices, thereby destabilizing commodity markets. The presence of a liquid fuels blend wall causes a similar disjoint in the transmission of energy prices to agriculture, as well as increasing commodity price volatility.
Comparing the three scenarios, having no biofuel policy leads to the highest transmission of energy price volatility on commodity price variation and the lowest impact from corn production volatility. This is because the model is able to respond to both high and low oil prices; and corn production shocks are spread out across all sectors, minimizing the potential impacts. When we implement a specific policy (either the RFS or a blend wall), the impacts from energy price volatility are smaller than the base case as a portion of the model is essentially shut off (either from low or high oil prices). The impacts from corn production volatility are magnified in the presence of the policy regimes as half of corn allocation is removed from possible variation.
In the most extreme case, wherein both the RFS and the blend wall are simultaneously binding, US coarse grains price volatility in response to corn supply shocks is 57% higher than in the non-binding case, and world price volatility is boosted by 25%. In short, we envision a future in which agricultural price volatility -particularly for biofuel feedstocks -will depend critically on renewable energy policies. Indeed, these may dominate the traditional importance of agricultural commodity policies in many markets. 
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